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 In his 1984 book Hospitalité Française : Racisme et immigration Maghrébine, 
Tahar Ben Jelloun wrote, “Lethal racism and passionate rejection of the other are 
gashes being inflicted on the face of France.”1 The comment stands as an apt 
reflection of a moment in which race had come to the forefront of much political 
discussion in France. This question of race and the “other” often centered on 
France’s population of Maghrebi youth in particular, who found themselves caught 
in the middle of heated arguments about race, immigration, and belonging in France, 
and participated actively in their own demonstrations such as the 1983 Marche pour 
l’égalité et contre racisme.2 The demonstrations turned violent in the 1990s, when a 
wave of rioting broke out in the Parisian banlieues after the deaths of two boys of 
African descent (one Maghrebi, the other Malian). The riots caused a media storm 
that captured the world’s attention, turning a public eye on Paris’ racial tensions and 
perpetuating an image of the banlieues as being on the brink of explosion with their 
prevalence of crime, violence, and anomie.3  
In the last decades of the twentieth century, with racial and socioeconomic 
tensions running high, it seems that everywhere in the metropôle people were 
looking to redefine what it meant to be French in a post-colonial world. It is at this 
time, in the late 1980s and 1990s, that the term “beur” became widely used to 
                                                        
1 Tahar Ben Jelloun, French Hospitality: Racism and North African Immigrants, trans. Barbara Bray 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 44. 
2 Commonly referred to as Marche des beurs 
3 Tyler Stovall, “From Red Belt to Black Belt: Race, Class, and Urban Marginality in Twentieth-Century 
Paris,” The Color of Liberty: Histories of Race in France (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 355. 
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describe the second and third generation children of North African immigrants in 
France. These Maghrebi youth were often defined as an “other” through terms like 
immigrant, Arab—words that connote or even stress their social marginalization. 
The beurs, in turn, tend to express themselves using a collective identity defined by 
this sense of social marginalization and otherness.  
This thesis seeks to elucidate the concept of a Parisian “beur culture” as it 
surfaced during this period by examining the emergence of this collective identity as 
it is constructed both externally and within the group, with special attention paid to 
the ways in which it relies on a sense of social marginalization from mainstream 
France. The first chapter provides an overview of the history of Arab and North 
African immigration in France as its make up shifted over time, informing a complex 
set of policies and politics regarding North Africans, which in turn informed 
perceptions of the beur population of the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter 2 delves into 
the concept of beurs as a social minority, specifically examining levels of spatial 
segregation. In so doing, the chapter also introduces the centrality of the Paris 
banlieues to the understanding of beur identity. Chapter 3 primarily explores the 
artistic expressions of beur identity in the 1990s and the wave of Americanization, 
which appropriated African-American hip-hop culture to express a sense of social 






Chapter 1: Beurs and the Cultural Inheritance 
 
Most French people equate a Maghrebi with an Arab with a Muslim… It is 
true that Maghrebis are often considered, not for that which they truly are, 
but for that which others suppose them to be, along with all the prejudices 
that the facts of the history of colonization carry with them, with all those 
stereotypes forged by men. 4 
   
 -Mohand Khellil 
 
The concept of collective identity is one so elusive to definition as to inspire 
years of scholarly debate. For beurs, the pin-pointing of any specific identity is no 
less of a complex process. The confusion regarding beur identity in the late 
twentieth-century—that is, the tendency to “equate a Maghrebi with an Arab with a 
Muslim”—is greatly informed by the complex history of North Africans in France—a 
history that encompassed colonization, brutal war, and subsequent waves of 
immigration. In this chapter, I seek to examine the history of North African presence 
in France, highlighting shifts in its make-up and the lasting legacies that it left in 
terms of reactionary policy and public perception that both still informed the 
creation of collective identity for the beurs many years later. 
 
Early Arab Presence in Paris and the Roots of Assimilation 
The term “beur,” which emerged in France in the 1980s and consists of an 
etymological slang derivative of the word Arabe, stands as a melding of two ethno-
cultural identities in France: that of North African descendants and that of the white 
French. Behind this term exists a long history of French-Arab relations that would 
                                                        
4 Mohand Khellil, “Un phénomène migratoire,” Maghrébins de France de 1960 à nos jours: la naissance 
d’une communauté (Toulouse: Éditions Privat, 2004), 46. My translation. 
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come to inform the experiences, cultures, and identities of these beurs. The 
significance of these historic relations comes across most clearly with an 
understanding of the recent, twentieth-century history of North Africans as 
migrants in France. In examining the ethno-cultural identity of these beurs some 
understanding of Arabs’ place in the history of Paris proves useful as it informs 
much of the later confusion of beur identity through the complex colonial and 
migrant history that fails to provide a context for the emergence of a clear or 
consistent political identity to North Africans in France.  
The Arab presence has an extensive history in Paris. As early as the 
Napoleonic Era, a “small handful” of Arabs had settled in the city, comprising a 
group of intellectuals that made their way within the elite circles of Paris.5 Though 
small, this group labeled generally as “Arab” was made up of a diverse mix of 
Egyptians, Turks and North Africans, of whom there were Christians, Jews, and 
Muslims alike.6 Evidence suggests the existence of “close affective relations” 
between these Arabs and native Parisians and this seems hardly surprising, as their 
presence was based out of connections within small elite circles.7  
France would not extend its colonial empire into North Africa until 1881.8 
Nonetheless, towards the last years of the Empire a very early foreshadowing of 
modern-day relations between white and Arab Parisians seems to emerge. During 
this time, the Arab presence in Paris shifted to become “a growing heterogeneous 
                                                        
5 Ian Coller. Arab France: Islam and the Making of Modern Europe, 1798-1831. (Berkeley, CA, USA: 
University of California Press, 2010), 85. 
6 Ibid 77 
7 Ibid 83 
8 Mary McAuliffe, Dawn of the Belle Epoque: the Paris of Monet, Zola, Berhardt, Eiffel, Debussy, 
Clemenceau, and Their Friends (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), 110. 
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population flottante,” which included the settlement of several poorer groups of 
Arabs.9 This larger population begins to exhibit some of the attributes of poverty 
and heterogeneity that would become associated with later groups of North Africans 
and can even be used to characterize the post-colonial Maghrebis of the late 20th 
century. Around the beginning of the 1800s, as well, is when the policies of 
assimilation came to play a large role in colonial policy as it would come to 
dominate much of the dialogue surrounding immigration in later years.10  
The French policy of assimilation aimed to subsume Algeria under the 
heading of “French Culture” by “civilizing” the natives.11 In 1848 the French 
Republic declared Algeria an extension of French soil,12 essentially “complet[ing] the 
attempt to assimilate the Algerian people” on a cultural level in addition to a 
territorial one.13 The irony within the political reality of assimilation is that 
“Muslims” (native Algerians) were separated from the white French colons through 
a hierarchical system that created complex sub-categories of “citizenship,” granting 
fewer political rights to Algerian “Muslims.”14  
Assimilation may have aimed to subsume Algeria under the heading of 
French culture in a colonial “civilizing mission”, but the brutal reality was that 
native Algerians were at the bottom of a hierarchical system of status and had to 
                                                        
9 Coller 85 
10 Saliha Belmessous, Assimilation and Empire: Uniformity in French and British Colonies, 1541-1954 
(Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013), 117.  
11 Helen Drake, Contemporary France (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 149. 
12 Algeria was the only colony granted this status. 
13 Belmessous 124 
14 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 9. 
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appeal to the French government in order to gain full citizenship.15 Though formally 
granted citizenship in the 1940s, Algerian “Muslims” were still not given many of the 
political rights associated with the French Republic, putting them in a kind of 
political limbo that was not clarified by French officials until the Algerian 
Revolution.16 This gap between the purported ideology and the reality of 
assimilation policies created tensions that carried into the late twentieth-century, 
and the beurs would remain subject to accusations that they were an inassimilable 
group within French society even in these later years. 
During the years of colonization in the mid to late nineteenth century, the 
issues of North African assimilation and Arab identity within the Francophone 
world were far from home—viewed as problems of the colonies rather than 
mainland France. In his book, Arab France: Islam and the Making of Modern Europe, 
1798-1831, Ian Coller ventures to guess that even as the Arab population of Paris 
evolved to include a wider demographic range, their scattered settlement in relation 
to each other probably did not foster a fruitful environment for the development of 
any collective sense of Arab identity. Neither did it allow for any visibility of the 
Arabic language or Arab culture as a part of the broader Paris landscape.17 
Temporally speaking, then, the emergence of a Franco-Arab culture in Paris appears 
to have taken place in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It is here that we see 
                                                        
15 Belmessous 125 
16 Shepard, 45. 
17 Coller 85 
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the first large wave of Arab immigration to Paris, coming in the form of North 
African migrants from the colonies.18  
 
Early Immigration 
North African migration to France in the late 1800s amounted to the first 
trickle of what would become a series of larger waves of industrial migrant workers 
coming to France from the Maghreb. This initial Maghrebi immigration took place 
mainly on the part of Algerians, and therefore, strictly speaking, was no true 
“immigration” at all as Algeria was considered an extension of France for the 
majority of its years as a French colony. Yet for all intents and purposes, these 
Algerians were treated as immigrants, even by the French government—a common 
miscategorization which serves as precursor for the continuing common use of 
“immigrant” to describe those of North African origin19 that has lasted up until the 
present. The fact that these earlier [French-] Algerians were characterized as 
immigrants is evidenced in a myriad of ways, but perhaps the simplest comes from 
the fact that the official French census up until 1961 placed those of its Algerian 
subjects living in metropolitan France under the category of “foreigners” 
(étrangères). 
While the label of “foreigner” would stick with these populations for years to 
come, the composition of these “immigrant” groups changed many times over the 
                                                        
18 In both contemporary and historical discourse, “North African,” “Muslim,” and “Arab” tend to be 
used somewhat interchangeably. Many North Africans, however, were and are not ethnically “Arab,” 
but Berber—a distinction often ignored or over-emphasized depending on context and intent. This 
fact further complicates the already tangled study of those of North African origin in France, 
especially when this study is done through a racial lens. 
19 And those of the other colonies and territories. 
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course of the 20th century. The majority of the early Algerian immigrants were 
unskilled migrant workers from the oft-mentioned region of Kabylia, a mountainous 
region on the coast of northern Algeria.20 Using the Exoticist rhetoric of the day, 
Kabylia was long hailed by French colonials as a tourist haven, seen as both free 
from the “seductions of Islam” and as a glimpse into an exciting world of strange 
customs.21 The reputation would stick and Kabyles would continue to be 
differentiated from the rest of Arab Algeria even into the postcolonial period, when 
Berber culture, language, and music became popularized in France and the Maghreb 
as a reaction to post-independence Arabization movements in the former colonies.22 
By 1912, there were about 3,297 Algerians, the majority Kabyles, officially 
recorded as working in France, with the actual number likely being closer to 4-
5,000.23 These early migrant workers typically found work in the metropôle in the 
olive oil and sugar industries of Marseille and the surrounding region of Bouches-du-
Rhône, and in the mines of the Pas-de-Calais. The significant portion that resided in 
Paris worked in a variety of industrial enterprises, as well, including sugar 
refineries, railroads, chemical industries, and the Compagnie general des omnibus.24  
Over time, the demographic origins of North African migrants diversified and grew 
to include more non-Kabyle Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans, and by 1931, the 
total number of North African immigrants in France had reached about 102,000. 
                                                        
20 André Nouschi, “Esquisse d’une histoire de l’immigration maghrebine,” Nord-Africains en France 
(1984), 39. 
21 Emile Masqueray, preface to Races berbères: Kabylie du Jurjura; préface de Emile Masqueray by 
Jules Liorel (Paris: E. Leroux, 1893 [?]), vi. 
22 Hisham D. Aidi, Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New Muslim Youth Culture (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 2014), 143-144. 
23 Nouschi 39 
24 Nouschi 40 
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This number would initially dwindle, probably as a result of the series of French 
decrees aimed at limiting North African immigration, but eventually these 
immigration levels would be dwarfed by the record-breaking levels of the post-war 
era.25  
Important to note is that during this period—indeed, until as late as 1974—
the nature of most North African immigration was cyclical, with the overwhelming 
majority consisting of poor male migrant workers coming to France for seasonal 
work and returning home for the rest of the year.26 This would change in the 1970s 
when the composition of the immigrant populations from the Maghreb changed to 
include larger numbers of families with permanent lives in France. The 
transformation from temporary cyclical male migrant workers to permanent 
families had a profound effect on the Maghrebi identity that emerged in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Not only did it prompt the building of the infamous banlieues on Paris’ 
periphery to replace the enclaves of migrant worker slum housing embedded within 
Paris, but the transition also enabled a shift in self-created identity among the 
second generation. While first generation Maghrebi immigrants felt a strong sense 
of pride in their country and “did not see France as a potential home for their 
nation-ness,” their children and grandchildren—that is, the beurs—tended to view 
France as a permanent home, and by extension, to view themselves as primarily 
French.27  
                                                        
25 Nouschi 43 
26 Alec G Hargreaves, Immigration in post-war France: A documentary anthology (London: Methuen & 
Co. Ltd., 1987), 13. 
27 Rabah Aissaoui, Immigration and National Identity: North African Political Movements in Colonial 
and Postcolonial France (ProQuest Ebrary, 2009), 158. 
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Overall, pre-World War II migration from North Africa made up a rather 
small proportion of immigrants in France as a whole, the majority of which were of 
European origin. These years were crucial, however, in establishing the relations 
between white French and North African immigrants in France that would go on to 
inform the post-war atmosphere and later attitude towards Maghrebi immigration. 
Additionally, in the interwar period, France’s high immigrant population prompted 
the French government to “enforce long-standing laws governing foreigner’s 
residence and mobility with a new intensity,” the likes of which had not been seen 
previously on the world stage at such a level of strict policing.28 It is this period then 
that begins France’s contemporary history of immigration policy, which had a 
profound role in shaping what would become France’s prevailing politics and public 
opinion towards immigrants and outsiders more generally.  
 
From Postwar to Postcolonial Immigration 
Algerians were the central force of North African immigration to France in 
the post-WWII era, making up as much as 93% of North African immigrants in 1954 
and 85% in 1962.29 The reason for the post-WWII influx is often argued to be a 
result of French land expropriation in Algeria.30 Contrary to that theory, Alec 
Hargreaves notes in Immigration in Post-War France that North African migrants 
typically came “from the very poorest parts of North Africa,” and those regions that 
                                                        
28 Clifford Rosenberg, Policing Paris: The origins of modern immigration control between the wars 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), xiii-xiv. 
29 Nouschi 46 
30 Silverstein and Nouschi both make this claim. Nouschi very pointedly cites causes of Algerian 
emigration as including population growth and the prevalence of overworked land, “particularly in 
areas where colonization had killed hundreds of thousands of hectares of good land” (Nouschi 45). 
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“had been least touched by modernizing influences during the colonial period.”31 
Niel MacMaster argues this point more explicitly in Colonial Migrants and Racism: 
Algerians in France, 1900-62, claiming that the map of emigration “shows an inverse 
relationship: the zones of maximum colonization and capitalist penetration were 
those from which there was a minimum of departures.”32 Instead, as MacMaster 
further claims, Algerian emigration stemmed from an agricultural production crisis, 
which “deepened dramatically during the war.”33 It was primarily a result of this 
massive food shortage that, immediately following the end of WWII and the 
subsequent lifting of a ban on free movement, Algerians began streaming into the 
mainland, the beginning of the wave of immigration made up of the parents and 
grandparents of the beur generation(s).  
In the aftermath of WWII then, about 350,000 Algerian men came to France 
to work. As before, most came from the non-Arab region of Kabyle and were 
typically poor, unskilled workers, even illiterate in both French and Arabic.34 These 
migrants tended to work in the manufacturing and construction industries in Paris, 
Lyon, and Marseille.35 Like during WWI, in the period following WWII, France was 
experiencing a deep labor shortage, encouraging immigration from the already 
starving Algerian population that needed little encouragement.  
In the years following WWII, many major changes occurred in the nature of 
North African immigration to France. First, as opposed to the French government-
                                                        
31 Hargreaves, Immigration in Post War France, 4 
32 Neil Macmaster, Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France 1900-62 (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press Inc., 1997), 172. 
33 MacMaster, 180 
34 Nouschi, 46 
35 Paul A. Silverstein, Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 4.  
Christensen 14 
regulated recruitment in the pre-war years, the post-WWII workers were typically 
recruited directly by employers and many Algerians arrived as sans papiers or 
undocumented workers.36 This, in combination with the 1954 outbreak of the 
Algerian war, changed the nature of North African immigration in France, which 
shifted from consisting of primarily legal, seasonal workers to a larger group of 
undocumented workers and refugees. Here, the status of these Maghrebi 
immigrants as “temporary” in France began to creep slowly towards their 
establishment within the community. 
The sharpest shift towards this change occurred later, in 1975. In the midst 
of economic recession and with high levels of unemployment, the French 
government placed heavy-handed restrictions on immigration. The move backfired 
and many families rushed to join their relatives in France before they could be 
locked out, cementing the trend towards their permanent establishment in the 
metropôle.37 By 1981, close to 1.5 million North Africans were officially recorded as 
living in France.38 
 
The Emergence of Beur Culture 
 The 1980s began the period in which the so-called beurs or “the second 
generation” would come of age. In the history of a constantly shifting make-up of the 
Maghrebi presence, the 1980s and 1990s can come to represent yet another shift in 
this series. The group was now larger than ever before and, unlike in previous 
                                                        
36 Silverstein, 29 
37 MacMaster, 13 
38 Nouschi, 45 
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generations, often had no direct ties to the Maghreb and its members were, for 
official French purposes, often completely “French.” Yet beurs were still commonly 
defined by their ethnicity and ties to the Maghreb.  
 For the first time, as Tyler Stovall points out in “From Red Belt to Black Belt: 
Race, Class, and Urban Marginality in Twentieth-Century Paris,” by the 1990s, the 
majority of immigrants in France officially came from outside of Europe. 
Additionally, he says, the economic downturn that France experienced beginning in 
the mid-70s lead to “chronic unemployment among young people in particular.” It is 
this mix of ethnic and economic factors that, according to Stovall, produced, “a new 
cohort of so-called second-generation immigrant youth (a term whose nonsensical 
character speaks eloquently to the prevailing confusion about race and citizenship 
in contemporary France).”39 The beurs, then, can be seen to constitute a group 
defined by this history of immigration, policies of assimilation, socio-economic 
status, and by social marginalization.  
As Stovall points out, the beurs emerged within a heated debate about race 
and citizenship in postcolonial France and the strong history as defining this group 
according to its ethnic difference makes the question of beur identity a complicated 
one as France does not officially recognize ethnicity as a marker of difference.40 
French scholars, too, tend to argue that race is an American obsession that has little 
to do with the history of France, which they claim is defined primarily by class 
                                                        
39 Stovall, 354 
40 The French government bars demographic censes from asking any questions with regard to either 
race or religion. 
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difference. Stovall refutes this argument, asserting that economic and ethnic factors 
both played dynamic roles in the shaping of the beur identity.  
In “L’Invention de la ‘culture beur,’” Sylvie Durmelat further problematizes 
the “confusion about race and citizenship” that Stovall highlights. More precisely, 
Durmelat points to the problem of naming a group that is as diverse in its make up 
as the beurs (also variously referred to as “the second generation,” Maghrebi youth, 
and children of Arab or Muslim immigrants among many other terms).41 Durmelat 
emphasizes the socio-economic aspect of the beur identity saying:  
… In newspapers and in some sociological works one often finds the 
expression “second generation” coupled with the word “immigrants”… It is as 
if these people—born in France or having arrived there very young, and who 
in large part possess French nationality or have appealed to gain French 
citizenship—automatically inherit the immigrant status of their parents so 
that the majority of them have essentially “emigrated from nowhere.” It 
seems that this designation comes also from a desire to keep these children 
in the same socio-professional category as their parents (“Second generation 
of what? Of street sweepers?”) so as to reproduce the same class relations.42  
 
While Durmelat relates the problematic envisioning of the beur generation to class 
relations, the inability to name this group “in any satisfying manner” can also be 
taken, in line with Stovall’s argument, as a sign of anxiety surrounding ethnic 
recognition in France. The problem of this multiplicity of names further complicates 
the notion of collective identity, perhaps even further contributing to feelings of 
social marginalization with this absence of any politically correct term. Collective 
identity will be further discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
                                                        
41 Sylvie Durmelat, “L’Invention de la ‘culture beur,’” (UMI Dissertations Publishing, 1995), 9. 
42 Durmelat, 33. My translation. 
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Chapter 2: The Banlieues, Spatial Isolation and the Making of a Social Minority 
 
In “Black, Blanc, Beur,” historian Alec Hargreaves asserts that “North Africans 
are by far the most disliked minority in France.”43 Indeed, as Hargreaves goes on to 
point out, it appears that North Africans tend to be vastly overrepresented in the 
political arguments renouncing the “problem” of immigration in France.44 
Furthermore, a 2007 Gallup poll showed Muslims as the group least likely to be 
wanted as a neighbor in France.45 In the late twentieth-century as in the early 
twenty-first, their status as a “social minority” plays a major role in the 
understanding of beur identity was both inwardly and outwardly constructed. This 
chapter will then seek to explain in what ways beurs constitute a social minority 
along with some of the ways in which this status was informed. Important factors of 
this discussion include the spatial settlement of North African immigrants in the 
post-war period and how the spatiality of this group made its move from urban 
enclave to banlieue over time. The social reflections and ramifications of this spatial 
history are far-reaching, and help to explain a number of factors that play into the 
beur cultural identity of the 1980s and 90s. For this reason, particular attention will 
be placed on segregation and isolation—the classification of beurs as a minority in 
socio-spatial terms. 
 
                                                        
43 Alec G. Hargreaves, “Black, Blanc, Beur: multi-coloured Paris,” Journal of Romance Studies Vol. 5, No. 
3 (2005), 95. 
44 Hargreaves, “Black, Blanc, Beur,” 93. 
45 Chloe Picchio, “The Influence of Women on the Degree of Integration in France’s Maghrebi Muslim 
Communities,” (Paper for Gender and Migration by Professor José Moya, 2014).  
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Settlement patterns in Ile-de-France, 1962-1999 
As seen in the series of maps below, the period from 1962-1999 in the region 
of Ile-de-France, which includes Paris proper and its urban and suburban 
surroundings, represents a gradual move out of the city center and into the 
surrounding departements. This is true as a general trend, representative of a 
broader move towards suburbanization; the trend is especially acute, however, as it 
pertains to the case of Paris’ immigrant population, which was pushed out of the city 
as a result of a post-colonial resurgence in the building of social housing projects in 
Paris—the creation of the so-called banlieues. Much has been written in 
condemnation of banlieue housing, which consisted of huge estates or cités meant to 
house lower-income families and raise their standard of living in terms of improved 
amenities and reduced overcrowding—major problems of the bidonvilles that 
typified poor housing for many years before. Built solely on the periphery of the city, 
however, the new social housing quickly gained its notoriety for the major 
segregation of the poor that it entailed. 
Looking at maps of the spatial settlement of immigrant groups in Paris after 
1961, several patterns immediately emerge. By comparing settlement patterns of 
European immigrants and North African immigrants, these maps display the 
unequal level of segregation between immigrant groups and native French that 
existed continuously from 1961 to 1999. Because this comparison examines a 
discrepancy that occurs between two groups that are both largely made up of 
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foreign unskilled laborers, the findings may point to a relationship between 
ethnicity and level of segregation in Greater Paris.46   
At the very least, the maps show that there is a distinct difference in 
settlement patterns between that of European immigrants and that of North African. 
Specifically, Maghrebis were most prominent in the departments of Seine-Saint-
Denis, Val-d’Oise, and Hauts-de-Seine. Europeans tended to make up a much greater 
proportion of the populations of Val-de-Marne, Seine-et-Marne, Essonne, and 
Yvelines, almost an exact inverse to the North African population. This trend 
becomes further pronounced over time. The figures below provide a visualization of 
this trend, showing side by side where Maghrebi immigrants settled within l’Ile-de-
France in comparison to European immigrants.  Here, the color gradient represents 
increasing concentrations of the given ethnic group when compared to the total 
population of that area (that is, darkest blue represents the highest concentration of 









                                                        
46 Here, I use the term “Greater Paris” to mean the entire region of Ile-de-France, though my research 
at the communal level is limited to the Petite Couronne. 
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47 All shapefiles sourced from Actualitix; for more information on data sources, see the appendix. 

















The departments in which European immigrants appear to make up higher 
percentages of the population are also the areas most populated by French citizens. 
This is not true of the North African population, which tends to make up a higher 
percentage of the population in areas in which there are fewer French. The indices 
of dissimilarity at the departmental level for 1962-1999 confirm this trend, showing 
that Maghrebi immigrants are consistently nearly three times more segregated from 
the French than are the Europeans.   
 
Indices of Dissimilarity- Ile-de-France Region (departmental level) 
Year 1962 1968 1975 1982 1990 1999 
Euro/French Index 5.42 4.95 5.75 5.02 6.22 6.26 
Maghrebi/French 
Index 
14.91 14.71 14.42 15.03 15.21 15.39 
 
 
In accounting for the higher level of segregation between ethnic groups, 
there are many factors that may be at play. A very likely factor in the making of this 
segregation is the existence of differences in socioeconomic background, which may 
skew these results if the two immigrant groups were not of similar socioeconomic 
standing. Socioeconomic difference, however, does not appear to be the only driving 
factor in the making of this particular case of segregation. 
 In the departmental maps from 1962-1999, the label “European” is applied 
only to Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish immigrants. These immigrants, particularly 
in the 1960s and early 70s were largely workers commissioned by the French state 
to work as lower-paid laborers, as were most of the North Africans living in France 
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at the time. Because this pattern of larger levels of segregation between North 
Africans and the French than between French and other Europeans emerges early 
on, these figures are suggestive of the existence of segregation based on ethnicity, 
even when socioeconomic background is accounted for as a segregating factor.   
The maps below display data from 1999 by commune—data not available (or 
not open source) for earlier years. These more defined maps help to confirm the 
findings from the maps made at the departmental level by showing the existence of 
even higher levels of residential segregation between ethnic groups when viewed on 
this smaller scale. This time, we see a more even spread of the European immigrant 
population, probably due to the nature of European immigration at this later period, 
which is not necessarily defined by an influx of low-skilled laborers, as it was in the 














French percent of total population
by commune, 1999
78.94 percent - 88.46 percent
72.36 percent - 78.94 percent
62.45 percent - 72.36 percent
0 percent - 62.45 percent
No Data
Percent Maghrebis in total population
by commune, 1999
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French percent of total population
by commune, 1999
78.94 percent - 88.46 percent
72.36 percent - 78.94 percent
62.45 percent - 72.36 percent
0 percent - 62.45 percent
No Data
European percent of total population
by commune, 1999
8.00 percent - 14.05 percent
5.00 percent - 8.00 percent
3.00 perccent - 5.00 percent
0.00 percent - 3.00 percent
No Data
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While the European immigrant population appears to be more evenly spread 
than before, the index of dissimilarity for this data implies a similar difference 
between the departmental and communal levels of dissimilarity for the Maghrebi 
population as for the European. The map of the Maghrebi population clearly 
indicates a higher concentration in the communes that make up Seine-Saint-Denis, 
the same communes that tend to have the lowest percentages of French citizens. 
The indices of dissimilarity at the communal and arrondissement level further 
support this evidence of segregation—showing, as before, a disproportionate level 
of segregation between Maghrebi immigrants and French citizens versus European 
immigrants and French citizens. This continuous difference between the European 
and Maghrebi immigrants is visualized in the graph below. 
 
 
The 1999 indices of dissimilarity show that Maghrebis were 
disproportionately segregated from the French in comparison to European 













Indices of Dissimilarity Petite Couronne, 1999 
(communal level) 
Paris, 1999 (arrondissement level) 
Euro/French Index 8.59 12.4 
Maghrebi/French Index 19.91 18.18 
Christensen 26 
comparison shows a much higher level of segregation with the level of dissimilarity 
standing at 19.91. This level is much higher than that of other European immigrants 
in Paris, showing that Maghrebis were much more segregated than their European 
counterparts. Even so, 19.91 is a relatively low number when compared to indices of 
dissimilarity for many other cities. Especially when compared with black/white 
segregation in American cities, Parisian segregation seems extremely low.48 
 
Indices of Dissimilarity in US Cities, 2000  
(black/white) 
City Dissimilarity 




Los Angeles 70.5 
Dallas 64.4 
 
The American racial divide, however, is an extreme case. When compared 
with indices of dissimilarity for other European cities, my findings ranked more 
similarly:49  
 






Even when compared to other European cities, however, Paris appears to 
rank low on an index of dissimilarity, but this changes when comparing my findings 
                                                        
48 “United States Segregation: Dissimilarity Indices, US Metro Areas Ranked by White/Black 
Dissimilarity Index,” CensusScope.  
49 Bevin, Joel Serra, “A comparative analysis of spatial segregation in three global cities: Barcelona, 
London, and Melbourne,” (Universidad de Pompeu Fabra, 2011). 
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with other sociological analyses. In his findings, Edmond Préteceille shows 
Maghrebi segregation at a rate that is higher than my findings and higher than the 
general (foreign/non-foreign) numbers given for Barcelona and London in 1991, as 
well. The discrepancy between Préteceille’s numbers and mine is explained in his 
article,  “La ségrégation ethno-racial a-t-elle augmenté dans la metropole 
parisienne ?” Here, Préteceille explains his numbers as inclusive of an estimation of 
unofficial migration—that is, migration not recorded by the French census and 
therefore not included in my calculations. The discrepancy between my calculations 
and his, therefore, is likely explained by this difference in methods. Préteceille’s 
findings add further support to my hypothesis, showing that Maghrebi segregation 
is not only higher than that of other ethnic groups in Paris, but generally high when 
compared to segregation in other European cities. 50 
 
Indices of Dissimilarity of immigrant groups in the Parisian metropole  
(1982-1990-1999) 
ID 1982 1990 1999 
Northern Europe 30.9 31.3 30.8 
Eastern Europe 29.5 28.1 25.9 
Italy 18.6 19.3 18.6 
Spain 24.6 23.1 20.2 
Portugal 19.7 18.7 19.7 
Algeria 31.7 31.9 33.4 
Tunisia 36.8 36.0 33.2 
Morocco 34.9 32.7 33.3 
Sub-Saharan African 35.7 33.3 33.0 
Turkey 43.1 44.8 47.0 
DOM-TOM51 28.4 28.7 29.5 
 
                                                        
50 Edmond Préteceille, “La ségrégation ethno-racial a-t-elle augmenté dans la metropole parisienne?” 
Revue Francaise de Sociologie, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Jul.-Sep., 2009), 489-519. 
51 Départements d’outre mer; Territoires d’outre mer (overseas departments and territories) 
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Préteceille’s work supports evidence of an ethno-racial divide in Paris that is 
more deeply felt by the Maghrebi population. There are several factors that may 
provide an explanation for these findings, however, that exist outside the question 
of racial discrimination. In Immigration in Post-War France, Hargreaves also 
examines the spatial settlement of North African immigrants in post-war France 
noting that in Paris by the early 1980s, North African migrants had settled largely in 
the “inner-city area” of northeast Paris. Hargreaves also claims that this population 
was more segregated within Paris proper than other European immigrants, but 
attributes this to the immigrants’ field of work, claiming that it was because North 
Africans were largely employed in the industrial sector that they figured more 
prominently in the populations of the “run-down working-class districts” of Goutte 
d’or, the eighteenth arrondissement, and Belleville, “in the area where the tenth, 
eleventh, nineteenth, and twentieth arrondissements meet.”52 The Spanish and the 
Portuguese, on the other hand, often worked as domestic staff and according to 
Hargreaves, lived closer to or within the well-off neighborhoods in which they 
worked.   
 Edmond Préteceille’s work directly supports this notion. In his article, 
Préteceille describes his previous research, which helped to expose a tradition of 
over-exaggeration of socioeconomic segregation in Paris. His measurements show 
that there was a “low index of segregation for the majority of social categories,” but 
a high index between the occupation cadres of enterprise and factory work. Overall, 
he says, there was an increase in segregation at the polar extremes—“rising social 
                                                        
52 Hargreaves, Immigration in Post-War France, 4. 
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exclusivity of the beaux quartiers” and “net rise in joblessness and job insecurity in 
one part of the lower-class quarters”—but the general trend was towards social 
mixing. His conclusions from this previous research, however, “say nothing of the 
evolution in ethno-racial segregation.”53 In other words, the previous work of 
Préteceille helps to rule out the notion of socioeconomic difference as the main 
driving force behind segregation of the majority of the Maghrebi community 
however; his findings heavily support Hargreaves’ argument that the ethnic divide 
was also partially a byproduct of class difference. 
 While my research provides additional support to the mounting evidence of 
ethno-racial discrimination as a factor in this spatial segregation, there are many 
other factors to consider before any conclusions can be drawn. An important 
alternate hypothesis relies on the theory of chain-migration, which dictates that 
immigrants’ communities of origin tend to dictate the neighborhoods in which they 
settle, thus creating immigrant neighborhoods that are somewhat homogenous in 
terms of immigrant origins. One way to test the hypothesis of chain migration, at 
least in part, would be to look at the differences in settlement patterns between 
Tunisians, Moroccans, and Algerians, respectively. Segregation between these 
groups would support a chain-migration hypothesis. If the groups are relatively 
mixed, however, it would seem more likely that this Maghrebi segregation is more 
ethnically-based.  
 While it is unclear whether the spatial marginalization of the second 
generation was encouraged primarily due to economic or ethnic factors, or even 
                                                        
53 Préteceille, 490-91. My translation. 
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whether this marginalization is due to any kind of negative discrimination at all, the 
experience of living outside the Périphérique greatly informed the beur experience. 
As shown in Chapter 3, the reproduction of imagery using the banlieues as a symbol 
for social marginalization informs much artistic cultural expression. Their spatiality 
is inherently informative of the beurs’ identity as an ethnic group that perceived 



















Chapter 3: Performing Identity Through Hip-hop 
 
The 1980s and 90s witnessed the coming of age of those children of France’s 
post-colonial wave of North African immigration and with it, the blossoming of what 
has been called a beur movement. Taking place largely in the banlieues of Greater 
Paris, this movement consisted of a boom in cultural, political, and artistic 
expression concerning the identity and treatment of la seconde génération. This 
“second generation” was often born in Paris, grew up in Paris and called it their 
home—only to be commonly labeled as immigrants and outsiders.54 The focus of 
this chapter will be on the emergence of a new identity, which consisted largely of a 
reaction against perceived ethnic discrimination and social marginalization as it was 
represented through a flourishing arts scene that unfolded with the banlieue as 
backdrop, a spatial center for its angst.  
 While the 1980s and 90s produced a flurry of Maghrebi cultural and artistic 
expression through a variety of mediums, this chapter will look specifically at the 
mediums of film and hip-hop, produced and popularized primarily in the 1990s. The 
cultural and media representation of the banlieues in this period consisted of an 
aesthetic highly reminiscent of black, inner-city America. That is, the use of 
American hip-hop style, slang, and rap music as an expression of cultural identity 
became exceptionally popular among France’s marginalized groups in general, and 
its Maghrebis in particular. The Americanization of the banlieues was so widespread 
that it even became common parlance to speak of blighted areas as “Le Bronx.”  
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Unsurprisingly, perhaps, is that this appropriation of style, far from an empty 
aesthetic, was used to illustrate the same themes of socio-economic hardship, ethnic 
tension, and social marginalization and isolation as its original American 
counterpart.  
 
Envisioning the Banlieue: Film Matthieu Kassovitz’ La Haine 
In the spirit of the “ghettoization” of the French banlieue culture, the 1990s 
produced a number of films that used hip-hop style to voice issues of ethnic identity, 
prejudice, and isolation. In fact, the Paris suburbs have since come to be seen on 
their own as an artistic symbol of marginality.55 With reference to Maghrebis, the 
North African youth of the banlieue found in hip-hop culture a style that resonated 
with their sense of being viewed by France at large as delinquents, social misfits, 
and “an inassimilable racial substratum of society.”56 Clearly, the banlieue is 
intricately linked with cultural conceptions of the issues surrounding Maghrebi 
identity and belonging.  
The interconnectedness of their themes and aesthetic makes it difficult to 
separate what might be called Beur Cinema with that of Banlieue Cinema. As 
Rosemary Wakeman notes in “Independent Filmmakers and the Invention of the 
Paris Suburbs,” there is major overlap between the world of so-called Banlieue 
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Cinema and that of Maghrebi or Beur Cinema.57 In “Re-presenting the Urban 
Periphery: Maghrebi-French filmmaking and the Banlieue,” Will Higbee suggests a 
practical reason for this crossover in his claim that, “Though political mobilization of 
“beur” associations (community groups or collectives) at national level in the early 
1980s had proved unsustainable, local organizations continued to provide a 
valuable support network, particularly within the working-class banlieues of the 
larger French cities.”58 Higbee credits these local associations with helping to 
establish a collective identity among the Maghrebi youth of the banlieues in 
particular.59 It seems fitting then, that a number of banlieue films produced during 
the late 1980s and 1990s also addressed issues of Maghrebi identity. Many of these 
films, including Karin Dridi’s 1997 Bye-Bye, Thomas Gilou’s 1996 film Raï, 1997 film 
Ma 6-T Va Cracker, and the most successful, Matthieu Kassovitz’ 1996 film La Haine, 
use the banlieue as the backdrop for an exploration of themes of beur ethnic identity 
and social marginalization in contemporary France.  
Shot in poetic black and white, Matthieu Kassovitz’ La Haine follows a day in 
the lives of three friends. There’s Vinz, a Jew, Hubert who is black, and Saïd, an Arab. 
The trio hails from a Paris housing project and the film captures them in the midst of 
a moment abound with political turmoil and violent tensions, especially between 
police and banlieue inhabitants. The film is a prime example of this 
Americanization—or hip-hop-ization, if you will—of the banlieue, first and foremost 
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with its aesthetic. The film is rife with references to American popular culture, from 
Cassel’s famous imitation of Robert De Niro in Martin Scorsese’s 1976 film Taxi 
Driver to the use of a hip-hop soundtrack, and various images copied from the 
American hip-hop aesthetic, like DJing and breakdancing, not to mention the street 
style of sneakers, athletic wear, gold chains, and wife-beater tank tops.   
In addition to borrowing directly from American hip-hop aesthetic tropes, 
the film’s dialogue utilizes the verlan of the suburbs, a type of slang originating in 
the Paris suburbs that carries many of the same connotations as America’s inner city 
lingo, but with a twist that renders it metaphorically apt as an expression of cultural 
difference. That is, verlan is a language of the streets, but also a literal inversion of 
the French language—“beur,” for example, being derived from a reversal of the word 
“Arabe.” This inversion of language by those who speak in verlan works to express a 
feeling of cultural difference in the clearest of ways; the rejection of the French 
language serves, too, as a rejection of mainstream French culture.  
 Much like American inner-city slang, verlan is associated with a younger, 
more ethnically diverse crowd, and often too with a kind of vulgarity, but it is not 
only the widespread use of slang and a visual aesthetic of hip-hop in La Haine that 
speaks to the film’s appropriation of American hip-hop culture. The themes that the 
film explores—those of isolation, living in a world of dead-ends, a rough world 
where police and discrimination are the enemy—are comparable to such American 
inner-city tropes as are present in the classic rap from Grandmaster Flash, The 
Message, which features such lyrics as, “God is smilin’ on you but he’s frownin’ 
too/Because only God knows what you’ll go through/ You’ll grow in the ghetto livin’ 
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second-rate/And your eyes will sing a song called deep hate.”60 It is with these 
themes about the dead-end road of “ghetto” life that La Haine makes a direct 
connection between the banlieue and the African-American ghetto.  
The vision of the banlieue as ghetto and an economic, racial, and social 
“other” to Paris proper is played out in various scenes throughout the film. When 
the boys make a trip into Paris, crossing over from their neighborhood into the city, 
they are visibly out of place, not at home. Immediately, the viewer sees the change in 
scenery where classic, bustling Paris is starkly juxtaposed against the barren 
landscapes of the banlieues in an excellent portrayal of “the fracture sociale, the 
yawning socio-economic-cultural rift that has increasingly developed in France 
between those who have and those who do not, which all too frequently also means 
those who belong and those who do not”61 As the film shows us, this “socio-
economic-cultural” difference between those of the banlieue and those of the city 
does indeed represent more than just poverty; this difference also represents a 
sense of cultural estrangement and marginalization from mainstream France. 
As the film continues and the evening in Paris carries on, the trio enters an 
art gallery. This scene, too, displays this socioeconomic sense of difference that spills 
over into cultural difference in that Saïd and his friends feel no connection to the 
avant-garde artwork, so ludicrously abstract as to seem trivial when compared to 
the very real plight of the three banlieusards. The trio creates a virtual chiaroscuro of 
harsh crassness and violence against the background of the stuffy, white gallery and 
the old white gallery director, who is as bewildered by and disconnected from the 
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three friends as they are from the city of Paris.  
 While the film finds its primary focus within the experience of the banlieue 
life more generally, it is also directly relatable to the beur experience in its major 
themes and its treatment of the character of Saïd. As Wakeman claims, “As a 
Maghrébin, Saïd is the stereotyped disenfranchised ethnic ‘other’ in Kassovitz’s film. 
He codes suburban space as a site of masculine ethnicity and delinquency.”62 I take 
issue, here, with Wakeman’s claim that Saïd is “the” ethnic other, as each character 
represents a category of ethnic other unto himself and the film features Saïd not as 
its main character, but as a side character—a player in the overall theme of 
otherness and unbelonging, but by no means the only example. 
 That being said, La Haine relates specifically to the issues of the second 
generation through the character of Saïd. His character’s interactions with the 
police, in particular, are used to show the second generation’s vulnerability to police 
brutality, as well as their unique sense of unbelonging and exclusion from French 
culture. Early on in the film Saïd makes this point, saying, “Un arabe dans un 
commissariat ne dure plus qu’une heure.” [An Arab in a police station doesn’t last an 
hour].63 The comment sets the viewer up to make sense of the sense of ethnic 
discrimination exhibited in the police’s treatment of both Hubert and Saïd.  
Later on in the film we find Saïd and Hubert being interrogated by the police. 
One cop takes a look at Saïd’s identification before spitting, “Saïd, c’est français ça?” 
[Saïd, that’s French?].64 This last comment, nearly lost in the blur of epithets and 
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slurs that the police hurl at Hubert and Saïd, is perhaps the most powerful message 
in the film’s commentary on ethnicity and belonging in Paris. Of the three 
marginalized characters, Saïd is the only one subject to the accusation of not being 
French. Furthermore, it is not his religion or even his skin color that is taken issue 
with, but his given name, a marker, not of religion, social class, or immigration 
status, but of a historical ethno-cultural identity. Saïd’s character, then, can be seen 
as an expression of social exclusion and isolation, based in large part on beur ethnic 
identity perceived within France as representative of an “other.” 
 
Rapping “Le Bronx”: Rap Music and Lunatic’s  
 As we saw in Kassovitz’ film, hip-hop music plays a direct role in the 
Americanizaton of banlieue identity and the many Maghrebis who live there. Similar 
also to Kassovitz’ film, the lure of hip-hop music seems to come from that fact that 
beurs apparently identify with its themes of ethnic and social marginalization. 
Politicization of popular music in France, however, especially among the Maghrebi 
community, is not limited to rap. The North African community in particular has 
tended to make use of reggae music as a means of “launching musical attacks on 
Islamism, Arab nationalism, and the policies of difference North African states.”65 
That is, a “gnawa-reggae fusion” that became extremely popular in the banlieues and 
in Maghrebi urban centers alike in the 1990s, served as a rebellion against the post-
colonial Arabization of North Africa in favor of a pan-African political stance.66 
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Nonetheless, it is rap music and an American hip-hop aesthetic which 
became more widely associated with the banlieues where so many beurs resided. 
Evidence of the extent to which American hip-hop had, by this point (mid-1990s), 
infiltrated the French scene is in a new law instituted in 1994, which limited the 
amount of outside music that was allowed on French radio stations.67 In his book 
Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New Muslim Youth Culture, Hisam Aidi attributes 
the institution of this law directly to the rise in popularity of American hip-hop, also 
noting the French public’s apparent fear of Americanized rap as a perpetuator of 
violence and social ills.68 
 While it is certainly true that rap music—French and American alike—often 
exploits violent rhetoric, there is nonetheless a powerful message of identity to be 
found in the reading of beur rap as text insofar as rap itself serves as a powerful 
medium for activism and expression of cultural identity. As David Foster Wallace 
notes in Signifying Rappers: Rap and Race in the Urban Present, “The pop tradition by 
which rhythm and lyric became melody’s supporting cast is [in the case of rap 
music] inverted. The rap is primarily the rap: that which is said must in hip-hop be 
the intraScenic locus of assessment, appreciation, complaint… The outside listener 
must not only take the rap ‘on authority’; he must read that rap as story”69 Indeed, 
French rap has served as a particularly effective canvas for artists to paint their 
social woes.  
                                                        
67 It should be noted that the French law limited all outside cultural imports, not just American ones 
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Perhaps more than most popular American rap, French rap often uses lyric 
as social commentary to its fullest extent and engages in serious activist dialogue. 
Such is the case with groups like Les Sages poètes de la rue, who use rap specifically 
as a medium for political activism, particularly with regards to race relations in a 
post-colonial world. Still, others are more popular and more typical of much 
American rap in their approach, especially with their use of misogyny and violent 
imagery reminiscent of “gangsta rap,” and a simultaneous expression of social woes. 
The issue of Maghrebi identity is evoked through likes of a multitude of popular rap 
groups hailing from various banlieues like Lionel D from Vitry, Supreme NTM from 
St. Denis, and MC Solaar from Villeneuve St-Georges.70 
 One chart-topping French rap track from 1996 was Le Crime paie performed 
by the rap-duo Lunatic, which features the two rappeurs, Ali or Daddy Ali and Booba. 
These artists hail from the Paris banlieues and both are of Maghrebi origin, though 
Booba is half Senegalese, half Moroccan.71 The duo stands on the popular rather 
than activist side and yet, their tracks speak to Maghrebi/banlieue issues of race, 
belonging, and lack of opportunity through the use of an American-style hip-hop 
genre and an appropriation of certain aspects of hip-hop culture such as criminality 
and “street style.” Le Crime paie, in particular, addresses Maghrebi youth identity 
through its lyrics highlighting these issues of race, isolation, and lack of opportunity 
for success, all while summoning an American rap aesthetic. 
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Le Crime paie openly addresses the issue of race, with Booba making it a 
central focus of the rap by expressing his self-identity using racial markers: 
 
Voici le métis café crème 
L’MC cappuccino, criminel au m-i-c 
Si t’es pas de chez nous, c’est  
Nique le taf, le biz fait briller les G’s 
Les beaufs claquent, mon style craque, reflète une ZAC 
 
[This is me, mixed, coffee with cream, 
The cappuccino MC, criminal at the m-i-c 
If you’re not from the hood, it’s 
Fuck working by the hour, hustlin’ makes a G shine 
Bite it, white trash; my style is sick, it shows I’m from the projects] 72 
 
Booba underlines his “mixed” status using the word “métis,” a specific reference to 
“the classical colonial stereotype of the métis, or the tragic mulatto” who 
“represent[s] a self-destructive hybrid threat to the racial status quo.” In “From Red 
Belt to Black Belt: Race, Class, and Urban Marginality in Twentieth-Century Paris,” 
Tyler Stovall compares this stereotype directly to beurs with the assertion that beurs 
form an ethnic group of “social misfits.”73 Booba’s reference to colonialism in his 
self-identification as an ethnic other supports the notion that a collective beur 
identity rests on feelings of social marginalization through ethnic otherness. 
 Not only do the lyrics of Le Crime paie evoke a colonial stereotype in their 
racialized self-representation, the rap goes on to address racial discrimination more 
directly. As quoted above Booba says, “Bite it, white trash; my style is sick, it shows 
I’m from the projects.” The use of beauf, which is roughly translated to “white trash,” 
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evokes the image of one who is white, poor, typically politically conservative, and 
racist. Booba’s attack is one characteristic of both American and French hip-hop—
an accusation of racism combined with the defensive embrace of his own “’hood.”  
 Booba directly addresses the issue of racism through this defensive style: 
 
Mon rap, un poème sans poésie 
Et puis quoi, ça fait quoi, dit-moi toi qui sais tout 
Si tu kiffes pas re-noi t’écoutes pas et puis c’est tout 
Seul le crime paie dans les villes du neuf ze-dou 
Face à face, que des regards froids y’a pas de yeux doux 
 
[My rap, a poem without poetry 
and then what, what does that do, tell me—you, who knows everything 
If you don’t like niggas, don’t listen and that’s it. 
Only crime pays in the 912  
Face to face, nothin’ but cold stares, there ain’t no friendly looks] 74 
 
With his line, “if you don’t like niggas (“re-noi”), don’t listen,” Booba exudes a sharp 
edge, yet the next line betrays some strain behind the hard exterior, “Face to face, 
nothin’ but cold stares, there ain’t no friendly looks.” This mixed portrayal of life in 
the ‘hood as both difficult, a constant confrontation with discrimination and as a 
place of belonging and defensive pride, is highly reminiscent of American rap music. 
Furthermore, these lines continue to use race and ethnic discrimination as essential 
themes in the expression of identity—the themes that have largely been deemed 
invalid markers of identity by French scholars and by mainstream France. 
 Rejecting mainstream France, the duo repeatedly imitates American-style 
rap to explore notions of identity: 
Seul le crime paie, si t’es pas de chez nous  
T’as rien appris, les vrais re-frés savent bien 
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Comment l’argent se fait, (décidés) à miser 
(Tout) dans le biz est passé au-dessus des lois et ça sans visa 
Vise la dégaine de ceux qui ont traîné leurs semelles plus d’une fois sur le 
bitume 
Tout comme le veut la coutume de ceux qui n’ont rien 
 
[Only crime pays, if you’re not from tha hood, 
then you ain’t learned nothin’, the real brothas know 
How to get tha money, gamble 
When you’re hustlin’, everything is under tha radar—no papers 
See those fools who been ‘round tha block, 
It’s the daily grind for who ain’t got nothin’] 75 
 
Here, Ali claims both that “if you’re not from the hood, then you ain’t learned 
nothin’,” but also admits that the hustlers of the banlieues, “ain’t got nothin’.” Similar 
to its American counterpoint, the rap is both proud of its hardness and woefully 
aware of the entrapment and social marginalization that life in the banlieue 
represents.  
 Finally, the last line leaves the listener with the strongest impression when 
Ali bemoans the trap that is crime in a life of poverty: 
 
Protège ton dos, les couteaux sont aiguisés 
Les frères déguisés pour des thunes peuvent te briser 
Comment mépriser l’argent quand tu n’en as pas ? 
Le crime est un piège, mon Dieu j’ai mordu l’appât. 
 
[Watch your back, these knives are sharp 
Masked brothers will break you over cash 
How can you hate money when you have none? 
Crime is a trap, and God I took the bait]. 76 
 




In his most powerful message about life in the banlieues, Ali says, “Crime is a trap, 
and God I took the bait.” The kinship that this duo from the Paris banlieues appears 
to share with African American hip-hop culture is largely founded on this feeling 
that crime is both the only option and also a trap for those who, like them, live on 
the outskirts of society. For the duo Lunatic and many of their contemporaries then, 
the banlieue is a trap of social marginality, economic hardship, and racism akin to 
that of the American ‘hoods of Chicago or the Bronx. 
 Looking at these examples in film and rap music from the 1990s, it is 
apparent that beurs saw something of themselves in black American culture. The 
feelings of social marginalization on account of ethnic and socio-economic otherness 
spurred this appropriation of African American hip-hop culture as a means of 
expressing a collective beur identity. The Maghrebi youth may have borrowed 
heavily from these American hip-hop themes and aesthetics, but they created their 
own French versions of the American art forms that were able to speak to beur 
issues in particular; their work addressed their own very recent history of 











 By the 1990s, the beur population of Greater Paris had made its mark on the 
cultural scene using hip-hop as a medium to express a sense of social 
marginalization distinctly tied to ethnicity and a long history of racial tensions with 
France. The group may have found their collective identity of the period by 
associating themselves with the African American ghetto, but realistically this 
notion of a French ghetto is, in the words of sociologist Loïc Wacquant, a 
“sociological absurdity.”77 The issue of the “ghettoization” of the banlieues, and the 
cités in particular would become the subject of much political dialogue as the cités 
were increasingly portrayed as “swimming in anomie and on the brink of constant 
rioting.”78 The fact remains, however, that “empirical observation reveals a yawning 
gap between the everyday reality of the cités and this media projection, not to speak 
of the situation in the black American ghetto in the early 1990s, where violent crime 
reached pandemic levels worthy of an incipient civil war without parallel on the 
European continent.”79 The conflation of the French banlieues with the likes of many 
of America’s inner city neighborhoods is deeply misguided and the two situations 
are sociologically incomparable however; this does not change the fact that the 
banlieues were perceived both by outsiders and those who inhabited them to be 
akin to the American ghetto in their racial tensions, violence, and a deep sense of 
social marginalization on part of the banlieusards. Wacquant’s insistence that one 
                                                        
77 Loïc Wacquant, “French Working-Class Banlieue and Black American Ghetto: From Conflation to 
Comparison,” Qui Parle, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2007), 26. 
78 Wacquant, 5. 
79 Wacquant, 23.  
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must remember not to conflate the banlieue with the American ghetto in fact only 
serves as further proof that by the end of the 1990s, the beurs had firmly established 
a sense of collective identity through their use of black American inner city culture.  
 This thesis has attempted to shed light on beur identity as it relates to 
feelings of social marginalization within the Maghrebi community by examining the 
history of North African presence in France, spatial marginality in the Paris suburbs 
over time, and by looking at artistic cultural expressions of beur culture. The 
question of identity is a complex one and, as Adam Krims notes in Rap Music and the 
Poetics of Identity, “‘cultural identity’ is not a tie with some pure and distant past, so 
much as it is a matter of continual appropriation, revision, and creation in the 
present, with an eye toward the future.”80 For the beurs, part of this appropriation 
and revision of culture is reflected through their use of hip-hop aesthetic and music.  
 Nevertheless, for the very reason that identity is a dynamic social construct, 
an interplay between outsiders’ perceptions and internal reactions over time, an 
understanding of collective beur identity as it existed in the late twentieth-century 
requires an understanding of some of the historical factors that came to shape that 
identity. For beurs, this sense of social marginalization can be seen, at least in part, 
as a product of race relations as they have played out historically in France. Their 
collective identity existed in and around the 1990s largely as a reactionary 
expression to the historically-created circumstances they were born into. It is not 
surprising that beurs tended to identify with their colonial past, seeing themselves 
as subject to continued negative ethnic and racial discrimination in addition to their 
                                                        
80 Adam Krims, Rap Music and the Poetics of Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
94. 
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literal spatial marginalization in l’Ile-de-France outside Paris’ Périphérique. 
Furthermore, the media firestorm and artistic expressions of culture which 
connected beurs with American black culture, misguided as it was, must necessarily 
be seen a major component in the ever-changing, dynamic construction of identity 
insofar as the concept of “collective identity” is made up of actions and reactions, 





















All data used in the maps, tables, and graphs from Chapter 2 are taken from 
the French census website, INSEE, unless otherwise noted. This data is relatively 
limited in terms of level of detail, at least of the data that is open source. Therefore, 
when looking at change over time, I was forced to use departmental-level data, 
which gives us a very rough estimate of the true indices of dissimilarity. Distinct 
patterns still emerged however, and those patterns were further supported by my 
later 1999 data, which I was able to map at both a communal and arrondissement 
level.  
I used created variables for the maps by adding the individuals from Algeria, 
Tunisia, and Morocco to create the category “Maghrebi”; for the category of 
“European”, I combined statistics of Italians, Portuguese, and Spanish immigrants 
for the maps representing departmental data. For the maps using communal-level 
data, I looked at immigrants from all E.U. countries. This significantly changes the 
socio-economic make up of the “European” immigrants for the communal-level map 
and thus, more outside sources will be relied on here to rule out socio-economic 
status as the main driving factor of segregation  
 In addition to the problems encountered with the spatial level of information 
available, this project had the added issue of trying to measure ethnic segregation in 
a country that does not officially recognize or measure race or ethnicity. Therefore, 
all the numbers here are derived from measurements of nationality. This measure, 
then, omits a significant number of French citizens that are also ethnically North 
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African and so in all likelihood, the appearance of segregation according to these 
maps and indices of dissimilarity is lower than in actuality. Algeria was considered 
an extension of metropolitan France during the colonial period and many Algerians 
chose French citizenship over that of Algeria upon Algeria’s independence from 
France in 1962. Additionally, by the 1980s if not before, there emerged this beur 
community comprised of second and third-generation “ethnic” North Africans. Many 
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